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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DOCTRINE MEETS
REALITY: DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL IN LIGHT OF
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
Pamela Glazner*

I.

INTRODUCTION

As the conflict in Iraq continues1 and the United States
faces a potentially perpetual war on terror,2 it seems logical
that the U.S. military would utilize every available
recruitment and servicemember retention plan. Instead, the
military has a continued to stand by a policy that officially
excludes an entire group of able-bodied servicemembers:
Don't Ask, Don't Tell ("DADT").' Originally, the military
flatly banned gay and lesbian people from serving in the
military,4 and it implemented a policy that weeded out gay
and lesbian people in order to deny them enlistment or to

* Technical Editor and Ethics Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 46; J.D.
Candidate, Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., English and
Communications, University of Denver.
1. See President George W. Bush, President's Address to the Nation (Dec.
18, 2005), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051218-2.html
(last visited May 11, 2006) ("It is also important for every American to
understand the consequences of pulling out of Iraq before our work is done....
To retreat before victory would be an act of recklessness and dishonor, and I will
not allow it....
We will see more sacrifice-from our military, their families,
and the Iraqi people.").
2. See id. ("Terrorist operatives conduct their campaign of murder with a
set of declared and specific goals-to de-moralize free nations, to drive us out of
the Middle East, to spread an empire of fear across that region, and to wage a
perpetual war against America and our friends.").
3. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000). This statute was originally termed the "National
Defense Authorization Act," but it is known colloquially as "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell." Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 920 (4th Cir. 1996).
4. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 935 (Luttig, J., concurring) ("For as long as it has
had a military, the United States has excluded homosexuals for military
service.").
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dismiss them.5 Then, during his 1992 presidential campaign,
candidate William Jefferson Clinton planned to end this
policy and initially began the process once he was sworn in as
president.6 Ultimately, however, President Clinton signed
Under DADT,
DADT into law on November 30, 1993.1
closeted' and openly gay but celibate people may still serve in
the military. 9 Therefore, this policy essentially excludes
openly gay and/or sexually active servicemembers. As a
result, many necessary and willing men and women are
unable to join or have been discharged from military service.
Indeed, not only has DADT been effectively utilized to
discharge nearly 10,000 servicemembers, 10 but it has
withstood constitutional challenge numerous times.1 '
Courts reviewing DADT have consistently applied a
rational basis test to uphold the policy.' 2 The primary
authority upon which courts have relied to apply rational
basis review and uphold DADT is the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Bowers v. Hardwick.13 In Bowers, the
Court held that there is no fundamental right to homosexual
sodomy,' 4 and consequently, courts have applied rational
basis to strike down DADT."5
Since most government policies withstand rational basis

5. Arthur S. Leonard, Speech, Lawrence v. Texas and the New Law of Gay
Rights, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 203 (2004).
6. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 921.
7. Id. at 923.
8. The DADT policy of exclusion is only triggered when servicemembers
make statements that they are gay or when they engage in homosexual conduct
as described in the statute. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)-(2).
9. Hensala v. Dep't of the Air Force, 343 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2003)
("[Tihe presumption [that the person in question engages in homosexual
conduct] can be rebutted by evidence of celibacy.").
10. Ten Years of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." A Disservice to the Nation, in
SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEF. NETWORK, 10TH ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T
ASK, DON'T TELL" 13 (2005) [hereinafter Ten Years of "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell"],

at
http://www.sldn.org/binaryavailable
data/SLDNARTICLES/pdf file/1453.pdf (last visited May 11, 2005).
11. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
12. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1998);
Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
927-28; Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260-61 (8th Cir. 1996); Watson v.
Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1412 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
13. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14. Id. at 191.
15. See supra note 12.
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review,16 it is clear that pro-gay advocates who wish to see
gay people serving a stronger military need a new legal
theory. This new legal theory must account for the embedded
tiered system under which analysis of constitutional rights is
17
conducted, as well as new doctrinal developments.
DADT suits a re-envisioned analysis in which Due
Process and Equal Protection intersect at the level of
intermediate scrutiny. Many gay-rights advocates claim that
the policy is clearly status-based, but DADT supporters and
the military claim that it is a conduct-based policy."8 Others
have observed that it is both.' 9 As a status-based policy,
DADT clearly falls under the Equal Protection rubric because
it discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation." As a
conduct-based policy, DADT clearly falls under the Due
Process analysis as an infringement of the right to private,
consensual, sexual conduct.2
With its 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme
Court created a space for innovation in analyzing gay and
lesbian rights cases, including DADT. In Lawrence, the
Supreme Court explicitly overruled Bowers as it struck down
Texas's same-sex sodomy statute.22 Nonetheless, Lawrence
did not hold that there is a fundamental right to private
consensual sexual conduct,23 so it did not raise the equal
protection analysis to strict scrutiny. Lawrence did, however,
discuss gay and lesbian sexual conduct in grand terms of
liberty, 24 and therefore can be interpreted to mean that there
16. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
17. In this comment, "rights analysis" refers generally to the analysis the
Court performs in cases involving constitutional rights violated under
substantive due process and/or equal protection.
When necessary, this
comment will distinguish between an analysis of rights under substantive due
process and an analysis of rights under equal protection.
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.4.
19. JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILITARY'S ANTI-

GAY POLICY 126-27 (Dilip Gaonkar et al. eds., 1999).
20. See discussion infra Part II.C.4.
21. See discussion infra Part II.C.4.
22. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
23. As Justice Antonin Scalia points out in his dissenting opinion,
"[Nlowhere does the Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a
'fundamental right' under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas

law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if
homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right.'"
dissenting) (first emphasis added).

24. Id. at 558-59, 562.

Id.

at 586 (Scalia, J.,
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is a right more important than those rights subject only to
rational basis review. Analysis of this newly articulated right
should be elevated to intermediate scrutiny of the type
Justice Thurgood Marshall suggested in his dissent in City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center25 since, along with this
quasi-fundamental right to private consensual sexual
conduct, DADT contains status-based discrimination.
27
6
Part I will examine the traditional and alternative
analyses and tests used to assess substantive due process and
equal protection claims. This section includes a discussion of
two key decisions: Cleburne8 and Lawrence.2 9 Part II will
place traditional constitutional rights analysis in the military
context and thereby illuminate its complications, particularly
those arising from judicial deference 0 Part IV will examine
DADT, its justification, and federal courts' interpretation of
it. 3 1 Finally, Part V will propose that courts embrace the
flexibility of Lawrence and apply an intermediate standard of
scrutiny to DADT, the result of which will be the demise of
DADT as an unconstitutional infringement of individual
rights.2
II. BACKGROUND
In order to apply intermediate scrutiny to DADT, it is
necessary to reconcile the traditional Due Process and Equal
Protection doctrines. Due Process and Equal Protection are
two separate bodies of law that exist to protect two different
types of constitutional rights: the Due Process Clause governs
"substantive constitutional rights,"3 3 and the Equal Protection
25. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
27. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
28. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.d.
29. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.b.
30. See discussion infra Part II.B.
31. See discussion infra Part IV.
32. See discussion infra Part V. This comment does not address another
possible constitutional ground on which DADT could be challenged: the First
Amendment. A number of other articles address this issue. See, e.g., Kelly
Wessels, The FirstAmendment and Expression of Sexual Orientation,5 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 109, 117-20 (2004); Tobias Barrington Wolff, Political
Representation and Accountability Under Don't Ask, Don't Tell, 89 IOWA L. REV.
1633 (2004).
33. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985).
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Clause ensures "the right to be treated equally by the law."34
Another way to frame the distinction is this:
If a law denies the right to everyone, then due process
would be the best grounds for analysis; but if a law denies
a right to some, while allowing it to others, the
discrimination can be challenged as offending equal
protection or the violation
of the right can be objected to
35
under due process.
These two legal doctrines are each composed of similar
tiers of scrutiny stacked upon one another: strict scrutiny sits
atop intermediate scrutiny, which sits atop rational basis
review. 36 Traditionally, however, Due Process completely
lacks an intermediate scrutiny level.3 7
Although the Due Process and Equal Protection doctrines
are separate and distinct, they do intersect. Indeed, when a
fundamental right is involved, the level of scrutiny in an
equal protection case rises to strict scrutiny.
This is the
only bridge between the two doctrines that a majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized.3 9
However, new
doctrinal developments, including the implicit use of "rational
basis with bite,"4 ° suggest that at least some members of the
Court would entertain innovative flexibility within the tiered
system.4 While a majority of the Court has not recognized an
intermediate bridge between Due Process and Equal
Protection, other members of the Court have. For instance, in
his dissent in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Justice Marshall clearly articulated the idea of applying
intermediate scrutiny when both discrimination and
infringement of a non-fundamental right are present. 2

34. Id.
35. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 696-97 (Sydney M. Irmas,
ed., 2001).
36. See id. at 529.

37. See id. at 698.
38. See id. at 695.
39. See id. at 695-96.
40. "Rational basis with bite" appears in both substantive due process and
equal protection opinions. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
41. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
42. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 460-61
(1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Spectrum of ConstitutionalRights Analyses

The analysis of constitutional rights by lower courts has
been defined by a series of Supreme Court cases that have
interpreted the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause exists
identically in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments4 3
and has a substantive component from which analysis of
individual rights derives.4 4 While the Fifth Amendment lacks
an equal protection clause, the Court has read into its Due
Process Clause an equal protection component. 4 Accordingly,
the Court in-Bolling v. Sharpe, a case applying equal
protection to school segregation, said,
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District
of Columbia [and to the federal government], does not
contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the
concepts of equal protection and due process, both
stemming from our American ideal of fairness, are not
mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a
more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due
process of law," and, therefore, we do not imply that the
two are always interchangeable phrases. But, as this
Court has recognized, discrimination 46may be so
unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.
1.

TraditionalConstitutionalRights Analysis

The Due Process Clause protects two types of rights
regardless
of
whether
there
is
discrimination:4 7
"fundamental" and "non-fundamental."' Whether the Court
will label a right fundamental is not entirely clear because
the Court has articulated two amorphous definitions:
fundamental rights are those "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty"49 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history

43. Both Amendments read "without due process of law."
amends. V & XIV.

U.S. CONST.

44. See Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1416 (W.D. Wash. 1996).

45. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570
(9th Cir. 1990).
46. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
47. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 698.
48. Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1416.
49. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
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and tradition." 50 The characterization of the right determines
51
the level of scrutiny a court will apply.
Laws infringing on fundamental rights receive strict
scrutiny, 2 which requires the government to establish that
the means the law employs "are suitably tailored to serve a
compelling [governmental] interest.""
With such a high
standard, the Court is more likely to strike down laws that
infringe on fundamental rights.54 On the other hand, laws
that infringe on non-fundamental rights receive rational basis
review,55 which merely requires that the means the law
employs are "rationally related to a legitimate [governmental]
purpose.'56
Under rational basis review, there is a
presumption in favor of the legislation, so the courts are less
likely to strike down the law."
Unlike the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection
Clause protects rights only if discrimination is present.55 It
has been interpreted to be "a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike."5 9 Generally courts
apply the same rational basis test that they use in
substantive due process to analyze laws that implicate nonfundamental rights. 60 However, courts will apply the strict
scrutiny test if there is a presence of either discrimination
against a suspect class, or discrimination coupled with an
infringement on a group's fundamental right.6 ' Under an
equal protection analysis, the Court has also created a
separate category to which it will apply a "heightened
standard of review,
otherwise termed intermediate
scrutiny.
When the Court finds a quasi-suspect class, the
Court will require that the means the law employs are
"substantially
related
to
a
sufficiently
important
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1416.
Id.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
See id.
Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1416.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
See id.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 528.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id.
See Eisenbud v. Suffolk County, 841 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1988).
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governmental interest."'
The definition of a "suspect class" originally derives from
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. In
Carolene, the Court indicated that it would apply a higher
standard of review when the law affected "discrete and
insular minorities."6 5 Courts have subsequently placed laws
into this category and applied strict scrutiny when the laws
classify by race, alienage, or national origin.66 To qualify as a
quasi-suspect class and trigger intermediate scrutiny, the
group of people "must 1) have suffered a history of
or
immutable,
obvious,
2)
exhibit
discrimination;
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete
group; and 3) show that they are politically powerless, or
alternatively show that the statutory classification at issue
burdens a fundamental right." 7 Courts have subjected laws
that classify on the basis of gender or illegitimacy to
intermediate scrutiny.68
2. Alternative ConstitutionalRights Analyses
In recent years, the Supreme Court has applied both the
Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection analyses with
less rigidity.6 9 Some justices, most notably Justices Thurgood
Marshall and John Paul Stevens, have found fault with the
rote and rigid application of the categories.7 0 The real
Different Justices use the terms
64. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441.
"intermediate scrutiny" or "heightened scrutiny," but the standard of review is
the same.
65. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
66. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
67. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 (paraphrasing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483
U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987)).
68. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. Justice Marshall, unlike the majority,
includes alienage in the list of classifications subject to heightened scrutiny
because of the Court's decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), in which it
struck down a Texas law prohibiting districts from using state funds for
children who are illegal aliens. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
69. See infra Part II.A.2.
70. See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his
concurring opinion, in which Justice Marshall concurs in part, Justice Stevens
says that equal protection cases do not reflect clear tiered standards but rather
"a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications which have
been explained in opinions by terms ranging from 'strict scrutiny' at one
extreme to 'rational basis' at the other." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Some
commentators have also latched onto this apparent discomfort with the tiered
system and have suggested other standards for evaluation. See, e.g., Suzanne
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erosion, however, occurred in the majority opinions of various
due process and equal protection cases, but it occurred
Employing
without the Court expressly mentioning it.
substantive due process analyses, the majority opinions in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey7 and Lawrence v. Texas72
undermined the unbending tiered analysis by applying new
tests and ambiguous language. In addition, employing equal
protection analyses, the majority opinions in Plyler v. Doe,78
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,4 and Romer v.
Evans7 5 all impliedly altered the rigid tiered analysis.
a. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
In substantive due process analysis, the prime example of
the erosion of the tiered analysis is Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.7 6 In Casey, abortion clinics and physicians challenged
as facially unconstitutional a Pennsylvania abortion law that
included a spousal notification requirement.7 7 In its holding,
the Court reaffirmed a fundamental right to abortion,78 but a
plurality 9 abandoned the traditional strict scrutiny analysis
Since the Supreme Court
for an "undue burden" test.80
enunciated an entirely new test in Casey, legal commentators
and scholars have suggested that the Court is leaning toward
a more fluid evaluation of substantive due process claims.8"
B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 492 (2004)
(suggesting a single standard for the evaluation of equal protection claims
composed of an 'intracontextual,' 'extracontextual' and "'bias' inquiry").
71. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
72. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
73. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
74. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
75. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
76. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
77. Id. at 844-45.
78. Id. at 846.
79. The Justices in the plurality were O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Id.
at 843-44.
80. Id. at 846. The Court defines "undue burden" as something that places
a "substantial obstacle" before someone's exercise of his or her fundamental
right. Id. By using an entirely new test, instead of the strict scrutiny
traditionally used in abortion cases such as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973),
the Supreme Court undermined the traditional substantive due process
analysis.
81. Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1118
(2004) (suggesting that some of the Supreme Court justices are "moving the
Court to a more flexible analytical structure for evaluating substantive due
process claims").
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b. Lawrence v. Texas
The latest opinion to implicitly challenge the tiered
structure under due process analysis is Lawrence v. Texas, 2 a
gay rights decision. In Lawrence, police in Harris County,
Texas entered the home of petitioner John Geddes Lawrence
in response to a report of a weapons disturbance. 3 The police
found the petitioner engaged in anal sex and the prosecutor
charged the petitioner under Texas's same-sex sodomy
statute. 4 A majority of five, led by Justice Kennedy, made
the rare leap to disregard stare decisis and overruled Bowers
v. Hardwick.85 In Bowers, the Court applied rational basis
review because it found that there was no fundamental right
to homosexual sodomy, 6 and it upheld a Georgia sodomy
statute under that test." Lawrence expressly rejected an
asserted historical tradition against same-sex relations, a
major premise on which Bowers rested. 8
The Lawrence majority opinion, while expressly grounded
in substantive due process, 9 is "a theoretically ambiguous
decision."90 The Court referred to the conduct involved as
being encompassed in the concept of "liberty," and stated that
"[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice [of with whom to engage
in private sexual conduct].""

The Court did not state the

82. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
83. Id. at 562.
84. Id. at 563. The text of the statute is: "A person commits an offense if he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex."
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2003), invalidated by Lawrence. It
defines "deviate sexual intercourse" as: "(A) any contact between any part of the
genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the
penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." Id. §
21.01(1).
85. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Bowers was not correct when it was decided,
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v.
Hardwick should be and now is overruled.").
86. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
87. Id. at 196.
88. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570.
89. Id. at 564. The majority expressly avoided analyzing the case under
equal protection because it wanted to avoid loopholes where "some might
question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to
prohibit the conduct between same-sex and different-sex participants." Id. at
575.
90. Leonard, supra note 5, at 189.
91. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 567.
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applicable test or level of scrutiny and merely said that the
government presented "no legitimate state interest which can
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual."92 As Justice Antonin Scalia pointed out in his
dissenting opinion, "nowhere does the Court's opinion declare
that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the
Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the
scrutiny)
standard of review that would be appropriate (strict
93
if homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right."'
There are three basic interpretations of the Lawrence
opinion: (1) it applied rational basis review, (2) it applied
strict scrutiny, and (3) it applied neither. The first
interpretation asserts that Lawrence merely indicated that
same-sex sodomy statutes fail the rational basis test. 94 This
interpretation focuses on the fact that Justice Kennedy, in
overruling Bowers, did not expressly state that there is a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.95 Also,
the majority used language traditionally used in rational
basis review, rather than clearly applying strict scrutiny,
"which would have been the appropriate level of scrutiny if
the Court intended to imply there was a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy."96 This interpretation finds
support in the fact that Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Lawrence is similar to his opinion in Romer, which dealt with
gay rights. 97 As in Lawrence,98 Justice Kennedy did not
specifically state that he applied rational basis review to
Colorado's Amendment 2.99 In both cases Justice Kennedy
92. Id. at 578.
93. Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (first emphasis added).
94. See Meghan M. Peterson, Casenote, The Right Decision for the Wrong
Reason: The Supreme Court Correctly Invalidates the Texas Homosexual
Sodomy Statute, But Rather Than Finding an Equal Protection Violation in
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court Incorrectly and Unnecessarily Overrules Bowers v.
Hardwick, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 707 (2004) (writing that the Lawrence
Court was incorrect to overrule Bowers because the Court really applied a
rational basis standard rather than stating that there was a fundamental right
to homosexual sodomy and applying strict scrutiny); see also Martin A.
Schwartz, Lawrence v. Texas: The Decision and Its Implications for the Future,
20 TOURO L. REV. 221, 229 (2004) (interpreting the Court to have applied "a
type of low level judicial scrutiny").
95. Peterson, supra note 94, at 701-02.
96. Id. at 702, 707.
97. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
98. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
99. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32. Justice Scalia also notes that the
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did not explicitly state which standard he applied, yet he did
say that the states lacked legitimate purposes. Therefore, it
is a fair assumption that these laws did not pass rational
basis review.
In a second interpretation of Lawrence, some have argued
that the majority applied strict scrutiny to strike down the
same-sex sodomy statute, even though it did not expressly
state that it intended to do so. 10 0 This interpretation focuses
on the fact that the majority situates its opinion in a line of
cases addressing privacy and fundamental reproductive
autonomy rights.'0 ' The Lawrence majority opinion discussed
Griswold v. Connecticut, °2 Eisenstadt v. Baird, °3 and Roe v.
Wade,' 4 all of which addressed fundamental rights.0 5 It then
06
and Romer, 0 7
stated that two post-Bowers cases, Casey
cast further doubt on Bowers. 0 8 Furthermore, when the
Court referred to "liberty" rather than "fundamental rights,"
it did so only to ground in constitutional text its broad
recognition of the right to privacy in one's consensual sexual
conduct.0 9 In addition, the Court's reference to the lack of a
legitimate governmental interest was not a ceiling but rather
a floor, meaning that the sodomy statute failed to survive
even the requirements for rational basis review, which

majority does not indicate the precise test that it is using but that the majority
"evidently agrees that 'rational basis'.., is the governing standard." Id. at 640
n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. See Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?,88 MINN. L. REV. 1140,
1155 (2004).
101. Id. See also Hunter, supra note 81, at 1114.
102. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a
fundamental right to privacy and striking down a state law prohibiting the
distribution of contraceptives and information about them to married couples).
103. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extended Griswold's holding to
unmarried people).
104. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing a women's fundamental
right to abortion).
105. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-65 (2003).
106. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). This case reaffirmed
women's fundamental right to abortion, but a plurality rejected the trimester
system of Roe v. Wade and used an "undue burden" test instead. Id.
107. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down an amendment to
the Colorado state constitution that prohibited the state and municipalities
from enacting laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
on equal protection grounds).
108. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74.
109. Carpenter, supra note 100, at 1160-61. See also Hunter, supra note 81,
at 1103.
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therefore meant it also failed the more rigorous requirements
of strict scrutiny." ° Alternatively, the Court implied that the
state has a legitimate interest in regulating morality, but this
interest was insufficient to survive strict scrutiny."'
As a third interpretation, a few commentators have
suggested that the Court applies neither rational basis review
nor strict scrutiny. 1 2 Instead, the opinion indicated that the
Court "is abandoning the project of identifying 'fundamental'
rights so that lower courts can no longer simply apply a
mechanistic tiered approach to judicial review." 3 Some posit
that the Court found a quasi-fundamental right to private
consensual sexual conduct, which elevated the level of
scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny." 4
In her concurrence, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor decided
the case on equal protection grounds under rational basis
review and thereby avoided overruling Bowers. 11 Justice
O'Connor noted that Texas's same-sex sodomy statute meant
that people who engaged in the same conduct would be
treated differently "based solely on the participants
[involved]."16 Since this law "brand[ed] all homosexuals as
criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to
be treated in the same manner as everyone else,"" 7 it was
discriminatory and triggered an equal protection analysis."'
She further found that "[mioral disapproval of this group, like
a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis of review under the Equal
Protection Clause."" 9 Justice O'Connor noted that national
security is a legitimate state interest, but the state simply did

110. Hunter, supra note 81, at 1114. See also Carpenter, supra note 100, at

1156-57.
111. See Carpenter, supra note 100, at 1157.
112. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 5.
113. Id. at 209.
114. Christen Sproule, The Pursuit of Happiness and the Right to Sexual
Privacy: A Proposal for a Modified Rational Basis Review for Due Process
Rights, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 791, 812 (2004). See also Julie A. Greenberg &
Marybeth Herald, You Can't Take it with You: Constitutional Consequences of
Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 WASH. L. REV. 819, 877 (2005).
115. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 581 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
117. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 584 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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not have such an interest in Lawrence.2 °
c. Plyler v. Doe
One of the first cases to avoid the inflexible tiered system
in an equal protection analysis was Plyler v. Doe. 21 In Plyler,
the Court struck down Texas laws that withheld from local
school districts state funds used to educate undocumented
immigrant children. 2 2 Since undocumented children are not
considered a suspect class, nor is education considered a
fundamental right,'23 rational basis would appear to be the
applicable standard of review. However, the Court instead
required a weightier "substantial goal of the State,"'1 24 and it

struck down the Texas scheme. 125 The Court found that
"more is involved in these cases than the abstract question
whether [the Texas law] discriminates against a suspect
class, or whether education is a fundamental right.' 1 26 The

Court was concerned about the stigma that would follow the
children because of a characteristic over which they had no
control.127 Scholars have interpreted Plyler to create a new
quasi-fundamental right to education that implicates a higher
level of scrutiny. 128 The Court itself did not use this term or
any other term to describe the level of scrutiny it employed.
d. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
Beyond Plyler's expansion of equal protection analysis,
the Court has implicitly challenged the tiered system by
applying a level of scrutiny that legal commentators have
termed "rational basis with bite." 29 Under this standard, the
Court purportedly applies a rational basis test while, in fact,
it either applies rational basis review with more vigor, or it
actually applies intermediate scrutiny but labels it rational
basis review. 130 The Court employed rational basis with bite
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 223.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 223.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
See Sproule, supra note 114, at 810.

129. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 550.

130. See Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate
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in both City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center13 ' and
Romer v. Evans.3 2 In Cleburne, a majority of the Court
struck down a city zoning ordinance that denied a special use
permit to a group who sought to establish a home for the
"mentally retarded.' 13 The Court determined that there was
no suspect or quasi-suspect class present, and therefore
rational basis review should apply. 34 However, it rejected
the city's justifications for denying the permit, including
negative attitudes of nearby property owners, and the
facility's proximity to a school and existence on a flood
plain. 35 The Court also rejected the city's concerns about the
number of occupants relative to the size of the home since the
city would not have conditioned the permit on a restricted
number of residents had the home been used for another
purpose, such as a nursing home. 36 However, it determined
that there was no rational basis for denial of the permit in
37
this case.1
In his dissent, Justice Marshall expressed concerns about
the majority's application of the rational basis test: "To be
sure, the Court does not label its handiwork heightened
scrutiny, and perhaps the method employed must hereafter
be called 'second order' rational-basis review rather than
heightened scrutiny." 13 In addition, Justice Marshall called
for a clear intermediate standard. He said, "the level of
scrutiny employed in an equal protection case should vary
with 'the constitutional and societal importance of the
interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness
of the basis upon which the particular classification is

Scrutiny by Any Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 779-80 (1987).
131. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 435 (1985).
132. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
133. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435.
134. Id. at 442.
135. Id. at 448-49.
136. Id. at 449-50.
137. Id. at 448. Justice O'Connor's interpretation of Cleburne, as well as
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), and apparently
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), is that the laws in those cases were
struck down under rational basis at least partially because the Court is more
apt to find fault when the law "inhibits personal relationships." See Lawrence,
539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
138. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 495. See also Pettinga, supra note 130, at 794-96
(citing portions of the majority's rationale that indicated its application of

rational basis with bite).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

650

[Vol: 46

drawn."'13 9 He determined that the mentally disabled had a
strong interest in establishing group homes,'140 and they had
suffered a history of discrimination."'
Thus, a more
heightened standard of review than the rational basis review
42
the majority purportedly applied was appropriate.
Accordingly, Justice Marshall proposed that the Court
"require that the [law] be convincingly justified as
substantially furthering legitimate and important purposes"
when there is discrimination of a non-suspect class coupled
with infringement of a non-fundamental right. 4 3
This
language suggests that Justice Marshall was calling for
intermediate scrutiny in circumstances such as those
presented in Cleburne.
e.

Romer v. Evans

More recently, the Court applied rational basis with bite
to an equal protection violation in Romer v. Evans."M
In
Romer, the majority, led by Justice Anthony Kennedy, struck
down an amendment to the Colorado state constitution that
prohibited the state and municipalities from enacting laws
45
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation.1
The Court reasoned that it could not "say that Amendment 2
is directed to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete
139. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 451 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)). Invidious means "tending to cause discontent, animosity, or
envy; ... of an unpleasant or objectionable nature." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLIGATE DICTIONARY 659 (Frederick C. Mish, ed., Merriam-Webster, Inc.,
11th ed. 2003).
140. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 461 (Marshall, J., concurring).
141. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring)
142. Id. at 464 (Marshall, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 460 (Marshall, J., concurring). Similarly, the Second Circuit
determined that a court should apply intermediate scrutiny "in cases where the
classification is not facially invidious and the right impinged is important
though not protected by the Constitution." Eisenbud v. Suffolk County, 841
F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1988). The Second Circuit seems to misstate the test
because the traditional distinction is not between rights that the Constitution
protects and those that it does not. Instead, the distinction is between
fundamental and non-fundamental rights. See supra Part II.A.1. It is more
appropriate to say one has a right if the judiciary recognizes it at whatever
level. Further, if a court were to apply intermediate scrutiny and strike down a
law that prohibited some action, then one could appropriately say that the
affected group had a right to that action.
144. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
145. Id.
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objective."'4 6 Justice Kennedy did not specifically state that
he applied rational basis review to Colorado's Amendment 2,
nor did he state that he applied rational basis with bite or
intermediate scrutiny. 147 He simply failed altogether to state
which standard he applied. 4 s Notably, the Court found it
important that Amendment 2 was both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive, 4 9
characterizations
that
are
mostly
irrelevant in rational basis review, but pertinent under
higher levels of scrutiny. 5 0 This intensive analysis suggests
that Justice Kennedy applied such a higher level of
51
scrutiny.1
Taken together, these seemingly aberrational cases
actually defined the new landscape of constitutional rights by
either expressly or impliedly eroding the traditional tiered
analysis. These lines of cases challenge law students, legal
scholars, and practitioners, and they open the door to new
theories that can be used to strike down policies like DADT.
B. ConstitutionalRights in the Military Context
Constitutional rights analyses in the military context are
somewhat different than in the civil context. As Justice
Kennedy said as a judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, "[wihile it is clear that one does not surrender his or
her constitutional rights upon entering the military, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that constitutional rights
must be viewed in light of the special circumstances and
needs of the armed forces."15 2 However, some courts go so far
as to find a "constitutionally-mandated deference to military
assessments and judgments [that] gives the judiciary far less
scope to scrutinize the reasons . . . that the military has
146. Id. at 635.
147. See id. Justice Scalia also notes that the majority does not indicate the
precise test that it is using, but that the majority "evidently agrees . . .that
'rational basis' is the governing standard." Id. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 633.
150. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 532.

151. See, e.g., John H. Turner, Solid Waste Flow Control: The Commerce
Clause and Beyond, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 53, 90 (1998) ("Romer is, therefore, not
simply a victory for gay rights advocates-it is an unequivocal and triumphant
return to the 'rational basis with bite' approach that briefly surfaced in the
early 1980s and had its high-water mark with the Court's 1985 opinion in City
of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center.").
152. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 810 (9th Cir. 1980).
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advanced to justify its actions."15 3 The judiciary affords such
deference partially because of its self-declared inadequacy in
matters of the military.15 4 Courts also make a separation of
powers argument and reason that the military's policies
should be left to the legislative and executive branches.1 5 5
The political process, they argue, remedies any shortcomings
because the people will vote out the elected officials who
formulate undesirable military policy. 156 A few judges,
the government when
however, give less deference 5to
17
fundamental rights are involved.
C. The Military'sDon'tAsk, Don't Tell Policy
1.

Pre-DADTTreatment of Gay and Lesbian People

Historically, the military exhibited hostility toward gay
and lesbian servicemembers. 15 8 Since its inception and until
DADT, the military had flatly banned gay and lesbian people

153. Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding that
cases such as Cleburne and Romer were inapplicable precedent in cases
involving constitutional rights in the military context).
154. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 925-26 (4th Cir. 1997) (deferring
because of Congress's greater access to intelligence, expertise in military
supervision, as well as the President's authority). See also Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 65 (1981) ("Not only is the scope of Congress' constitutional power
in [the military] broad, but the lack of competence on the part of the courts is
marked."); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[I]t is difficult to conceive
of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence
[than the military] . . . [because oflthe complex, subtle, and professional
decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force. ...").
155. Able, 155 F.3d at 633 ("'The framers did not view the federal judiciaryappointed with life tenure-as the appropriate body to exercise military
authority....").
156. See Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 923 ("To overturn [military] solutions in the
absence of a clear constitutional mandate would transform the judiciary into an
instrument of disenfranchisement for all who use the political process to
register the democratic will.").
157. E.g., id. at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting) ("[Wihile I will defer, as I ought and
must, to the professional judgment of military commanders on things military, I
may never defer to their judgment on things constitutional.").
158. See id. at 935 (Luttig, J., concurring) ("For as long as it has had a
military, the United States has excluded homosexuals for military service.").
For a more detailed history of the military's treatment of gay and lesbian
servicemembers, see Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, A Ban by Any Other Name:
Ten Years of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell,' 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 403, 404-11

(2004).

20061 LAWRENCE AND "DON'TASK, DON'T TELL"

653

from serving. 9 Courts in this era upheld the exclusion policy
against constitutional attacks.16 ° For example, in his 1980
opinion in Beller v. Rumsfeld, then-Ninth Circuit Judge
Kennedy applied a standard between rational basis and strict
scrutiny to uphold a military exclusion statute. 16 1 In this preBowers opinion, Justice Kennedy reserved the question of
whether there existed a fundamental right to private
consensual sexual conduct.'6 2 Ten years later, in High Tech
Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, the
Ninth Circuit held that Bowers meant that the court should
apply a rational basis standard to the military's exclusion
policy since the Supreme Court previously held that there
existed no fundamental right to engage in homosexual
conduct. 63
In addition, the court declined to apply
intermediate scrutiny because homosexuals were not a quasisuspect class. 1 64 It found that the class failed the three-prong
test because "[homosexuality is not an immutable
characteristic," homosexuals are not politically powerless, and
the statutory classification does not burden a fundamental

right.165
2.

DADT's Mandate

The flat ban against gay and lesbian servicemembers
ceased when President Bill Clinton signed into law the DADT
policy.166 Under DADT, if a servicemember either engages in
homosexual conduct or states that he or she is homosexual,
there is a rebuttable presumption that the servicemember
will engage in homosexual conduct and therefore is subject to
discharge. 67 A servicemember may rebut the presumption
that the homosexual conduct raises by showing that
such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and
customary behavior; .. .is unlikely to recur; .. .was not

accomplished by use of force, coercion, or intimidation;
159. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 935 (Luttig, J., concurring).
160. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1990); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
161. Beller, 632 F.2d at 809.
162. Id. at 807.
163. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 571.
164. Id. at 574.
165. Id. at 573-74.
166. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 921-23 (4th Cir. 1997).
167. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
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the member's continued presence in the armed forces is
consistent with the interests of the armed forces in proper
discipline, good order, and morale; and . .. the member
does not have a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts.168

The presumption a statement of homosexuality raises is
rebuttable by showing that the servicemember "is not a
person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a
propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
acts." 169 A "homosexual act" is defined as "any bodily contact,
actively taken or passively permitted, between members of
the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual
desires... [and]
which a reasonable
person would
understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage
[in such acts] .- 170 However, the policy reserves two exceptions
under which a servicemember who made statements that he
or she is gay or engaged in "homosexual acts" will not be
discharged.' 7 '
First, the military will not discharge
servicemembers if they make statements or engage in conduct
"for the purpose of avoiding or terminating military
service," 7 2 or, second, if "separation of the member would not
be in the best interest of the armed forces." 7 3 The DADT
mandate is largely based on the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision and language regarding homosexual conduct in
Bowers.

74

In practice, DADT is only somewhat effective in limiting
a commander's discretion to eliminate gay and lesbian
servicemembers. Although commanders "can't directly ask a
servicemember whether he is gay, and they can't begin a
campaign
of
surveillance
based
on
unreliable
information[,] . . . they can initiate investigations if they gain
access to the fruits of 'asking' by other branches of
government. " 175 The commander also retains a fair bit of
discretion to initiate investigation based on homosexual

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. § 654(b)(1)(A)-(E).
Id. § 654(b)(2).
Id. § 654(f)(3)(A)-(B).
Id. § 654(e).
Id. § 654(e)(1).
10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (2000).
HALLEY, supra note 19, at 5.
Id. at 51.
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conduct. 176
The type of conduct that can raise the
presumption that the servicemember will engage in
homosexual conduct sufficient for discharge, according to a
Department of Defense Training Manual, includes "two
enlisted men holding hands in a secluded section of a public
park."1 77 One commentator envisions a situation like this:
A commander who notes with suspicious displeasure that
a male subordinate had marched in a gay rights parade in
civilian clothes, made a memorial gift for a male friend
who died of AIDS, and spoken in support of Clinton's
reforms can deem these acts to be conduct that manifests
a propensity. Even though no contacts are involved, the
servicemember will find nothing in the regulations that
allows him to challenge the commander's decision to open
an investigation. The investigator can then contact
college roommates, parents, and siblings seeking evidence
of homosexual contacts, coming-out statements, or any
other evidence that would manifest a propensity. Even if
the investigation turns up no new evidence, it is
nevertheless the servicemember's burden to show that he
has no propensity ....
"'
Since its inception, nearly 10,000 servicemembers have
been discharged from the military under DADT. 79 The
typical situation leading to discharge is evident in the lower
8
In Richenberg v. Perry,'8 1
court decisions about DADT."'
when Air Force Captain Richard Richenberg informed his
commanding officer that he was gay and failed to rebut the
8 2
presumption that statement raised, he was discharged."
The Eighth Circuit upheld the policy 3 and Richenberg's
discharge.'4 Similarly, in Thomasson v. Perry,15 the Fourth
Circuit encountered the same fact pattern where a Navy

176. Id. at 115.
177. Id. at 108.
178. Id. at 115.
179. Ten Years of "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell," supra note 10, at 13.
180. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1997); Philips v.
Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1421 (9th Cir. 1997); Watson v. Cohen, 124 F.3d 1126,
1130 (9th Cir. 1997); Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1131
(9th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996).
181. Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996).
182. Id. at 260.
183. Id. at 261.
184. Id. at 264.
185. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1997).
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Lieutenant wrote a letter to military officials in which he
stated he was gay. 1 86 However, Thomasson failed to rebut the
presumption that he intended to or had a propensity to
engage in homosexual acts as defined in DADT. 187 The
Fourth Circuit upheld DADT and therefore affirmed
Thomasson's discharge.' 88 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit upheld
DADT and the discharge of a Navy enlisted man in Philips v.
Perry.'8 9 In this case, Philips stated that he was gay and that
he previously had sexual relations with other men. 190 He
failed to rebut the presumptions raised and was discharged.' 9 '
Each of these cases demonstrates a fact pattern in which a
servicemember stated that he was gay, failed to rebut the
presumption that he would engage in homosexual conduct as
defined by DADT, and was discharged.
3.

DADT's Justificationand Reality
92
The primary justification for DADT is unit cohesion.
Congress found that "[s]uccess in combat requires military
units that are characterized by high morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion[,] . . . [which is] one of the most
critical elements in combat capability."'9 3 Military personnel
claim and Congress determined that the presence of gay and
lesbian people places these values at risk.' 94 As General
Norman Schwarzkopf said in the Congressional hearings
about DADT: "Whether we like it or not, in my years of
military service I have experienced the fact that the
introduction of an open homosexual into a small unit
186. Id. at 920.
187. Id. at 921.
188. Id. at 919.
189. Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1421 (9th Cir. 1997).
190. Id. at 1421-22.
191. Id. at 1422. There are still more cases presenting the same fact pattern.
See, e.g., Watson v. Cohen, 124 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 1997); Holmes v. Cal.
Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1997).
192. Hunter, supra note 81, at 1128. As General Norman Schwarzkopf said
in his testimony before the Senate, "It's called unit cohesion, and in my 40 years
of Army service in three different wars, I've become convinced that it is the
single most important factor in a unit's ability to succeed on the battlefield."
Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 595 (1993) [hereinafter Policy Concerning
Homosexuality Hearings] (statement of General Norman Schwarzkopf, United
States Army).
193. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(6)-(7) (2000).
194. Id. § 654(a)(15).
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immediately polarizes that unit and destroys the very
bonding that is so important for the unit's survival in time of
95
war."1
However, this concern has been challenged by studies of
the inclusion of gay and lesbian servicemembers in foreign
militaries. 1 96 For example, in 1993, the Secretary of Defense
commissioned a report of foreign militaries that revealed "no
serious problems resulting from the presence of open
homosexuals." 9 7
In addition, the fact that the servicemembers in the cases
described above have stellar performance records 198 casts
doubt on unit cohesion as a justification, since poor
performance would likely affect unit cohesion. For example,
in Richenberg, the dissent noted that the plaintiffs "Officer
Performance Reports (OPRs) are full of praise for his
professionalism, dedication, and leadership abilities, and he
received many medals over the course of his Air Force
career." 199 Likewise, the dissent in Thomasson explained that
"[t]he performance coin has no other side: the Navy does not
complain that [the plaintiff] ever rendered middling, let alone
deficient, service. "200 Moreover, some servicemembers report
no problems due to their homosexuality.2"'
Some commentators have also suggested that DADT
actually weakens the military, and consequently the nation's
security and defense, by eliminating and discouraging gay
and lesbian people from serving. °2 A 2005 report found that
195. Policy Concerning Homosexuality Hearings, supra note 192, at 595-96

(statement of General Norman Schwarzkopf, United States Army).
196. See, e.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 952 (4th Cir. 1997) (Hall, J.,
dissenting).
197. Id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
198. See, e.g., Watson v. Cohen, 124 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1997) ("His
fourteen-year naval career is marked with many awards and honors."); Holmes
v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1997) ("He earned
many honors during his service, including promotion to First Lieutenant and
Combat Military Police Platoon Leader.").
199. Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 265 (8th Cir. 1996) (Arnold, J.,
dissenting).
200. Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 950 (Hall, J., dissenting). The majority also
mentioned the servicemember's record as being 'commendable." Id. at 920.
201. Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1997).
202. See, e.g., Diane H. Mazur, Is "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" Unconstitutional
After Lawrence?: What It Will Take to Overturn the Policy, 15 J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
423, 439-40 (2004). With DADT, the military eliminates qualified military
personnel from its ranks, and it discourages needed new recruits. Id.
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nearly 10,000 servicemembers were discharged under DADT
between 1994 and 2003.203 Although this accounts for only
about 0.04% of all servicemembers who were separated from
the military during that period, 20 4 757 of those discharged
under DADT held critical occupations, °5 and 322 were skilled
in critical foreign languages such as Arabic, Farsi, and
Korean. °6 Furthermore, the report estimated that it cost the
Department of Defense approximately $95 million to recruit
replacements for servicemembers discharged under DADT
during that nine year period. °7
4. Court Decisions
Prior to Lawrence, most courts that considered DADT
applied rational basis review under the equal protection
rubric.2 8 These courts used various justifications for the
application of rational basis review over an elevated
standard. First, these courts relied on Bowers. They argued
that since legislatures were free to criminalize homosexual
conduct under Bowers, they were also constitutionally capable
of mandating discharge from the military for homosexual
conduct. 20 9 Further, since Bowers found no right to engage in
2 10
homosexual sodomy, courts applied rational basis review
and gave deference to the government in military matters.2 1 1
Second, these courts rejected the presence of a

203. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: FINANCIAL
COSTS AND LOSS OF CRITICAL SKILLS DUE TO DOD's HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT
POLICY CANNOT BE COMPLETELY ESTIMATED 4 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05299.pdf (last visited May 13, 2006).
204. Id. at 1.
205. Id. at 4.
206. Id. at 4-5.
207. Id. at 3.
208. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1998);
Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80
F.3d 915, 927-28 (4th Cir. 1997); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260-61 (8th
Cir. 1996); Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403, 1412 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
209. See, e.g., Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1411; see also Leonard, supra note 5,
at 207 ("Bowers has been the lynch pin for numerous lower court rulings-not
just gay issues-that involved individual claims of privacy and protection for
intimate life and choice.").
210. See, e.g., Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1416; High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990).
211. See, e.g., Watson, 918 F. Supp. at 1411 ("This Court is not permitted,
however, to substitute its own judgment for that of Congress and the military or
to question the wisdom of the military's policy.").
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fundamental right or suspect class.21 2 Therefore, an increased
level of scrutiny was not required.2 13
Third, and most importantly, these courts determined
DADT to be conduct-based and not status-based. 214 The
government framed the policy as conduct-based and asserted
that "a] member's sexual orientation is considered a personal
and private matter, and is not a bar to continued
service... unless manifested by homosexual conduct."21 5 The
government and these courts consistently argued that DADT
is conduct-based because "the statute carefully defines
'homosexual' for these purposes as limited to those who
commit, intend to commit, or have a propensity to commit
The result of such a
unacceptable sexual acts."21 6
characterization is that these courts did not apply a
heightened standard 21 7 and thus upheld DADT as
constitutional under rational basis review. 1 8
Many concurring and dissenting opinions in DADT cases
argued that the policy is clearly status-based. 2 9 For example,
that
Thomasson
determined
concurrence
in
the
a
"politically
conduct-based
was
characterizing the policy as
expedient fiction." 220 As one commentator explained,
to deny a conceptual, indeed a statistically noticeable
empirical relationship between same-sex erotic contacts
and the social group of self-described gay men, lesbians,
and bisexuals is not just conceptually absurd and
empirically heroic; it contradicts the persistent tenets of
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and queer political movements,
which have sought to endorse, not abandon, same-sex

212. See, e.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425; Holmes
v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997).
213. See, e.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 928; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425; Holmes,
124 F.3d at 1132.
214. See, e.g., Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); Philips,
106 F.3d at 1427.
215. DOD Directive 1332.14(a)(1)(a) (1994).
216. Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261.
217. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998)
(refusing to consider whether heightened scrutiny applies since the plaintiffs
only sought rational basis review).
218. See, e.g., id. at 635; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425-27; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
928-29; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 262.
219. See, e.g., Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 934-35 (Luttig, J., concurring).
220. Id. at 934 (Luttig, J., concurring).
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eroticism. 221
Some argue the policy is not conduct-based because
servicemembers may be discharged if they have a
"propensity" to engage in homosexual conduct. As such, this
propensity is more of "a hybrid of status and conduct."2 22
Since "the word 'propensity' means merely an 'inclination,'
precisely the definition the dictionaries ascribe to the
term,"2 23 the policy targets homosexuals, not homosexual
conduct.
Furthermore, the government's knowledge that
DADT is not conduct-based is evident in "its repeated
mischaracterization of the statute itself and its effective
misquotation of the testimony of the various witnesses and
legislators [who testified about the necessity and implications
of this policy]. "224 Some scholars point out that DADT is both
status and conduct based because the two are intertwined,225
and the policy depends on whether the persons committing
the acts are homosexual or heterosexual. As scholar Janet E.
Halley explains, "Every moving part of [DADT] is designed to
look like conduct regulation in order to hide the fact that it
turns decisively on status." 226 Halley elaborates:
[S]ame-sex erotic acts are now deemed to be differently
harmful depending on the sexual status of the people who
perform them. A true heterosexual might mistakenly
commit a same-sex erotic act [such as fellatio], but it
should be deemed harmful to military essences because it
tells us nothing about him; whereas a homosexual who
engaged in the same act harms the military because
his
227
act provides an unmediated view into his sexual self.
Another source that suggests DADT is a status-based
policy is a set of hearing transcripts the Department of
Justice submitted to courts to show how the presumption of
propensity to engage in prohibited conduct had been rebutted
successfully. 228 The most telling instance is found in the
transcript a titled the "Heterosexually Loyal Bisexual."2 29
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

HALLEY, supra note 19, at 62.
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 939 (Luttig, J., concurring).
Id. at 943 (Luttig, J., concurring).
Id. at 939 (Luttig, J., concurring).
HALLEY, supra note 19, at 126-27.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
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This transcript details two male servicemembers who
rebutted the presumption that they had the propensity to
engage in homosexual conduct and remained in the military
by saying they were bisexual but would choose to be sexually
active with women and not men.2 3 ° This illustrated that the
propensity presumption "can be rebutted only by affirmations
tolerates
the
of heterosexual
status.... The
DOJ
the
Loyal
Bisexual'
not
because
'Heterosexually
servicemember has done anything to disprove his propensity
to homosexual acts, but because he has demonstrated an
ability to adhere to heterosexual status."23 1
Following Lawrence, there have been a few lower court
decisions that considered Lawrence's effect on DADT.23 2 In
Hensala v. Department of the Air Force,23 3 an Air Force
reservist was discharged after stating he was gay, and the
military subsequently ordered him to pay recoupment of his
military-paid medical school expenses.2 3 4 The Ninth Circuit
refused to consider his constitutional claim in light of
Lawrence since Lawrence came down after the district court
decided Hensala.23 5
However, the court stated that the
parties could pursue the claim on remand.2 36
Some commentators have speculated about Lawrence's
effect on DADT. Some argue that Lawrence likely strikes
down the military's sodomy statute since it struck down the
sodomy statute in Bowers, which weakens the rationale for
DADT but does not defeat the policy. 237 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Lawrence
does not affect the military's sodomy law as applied to a
particular appellant's conduct because that conduct fell
outside Lawrence's scope.2 38 However, a military appeals
court recently ruled that the sodomy statute must be struck

230. Id.
231. HALLEY, supra note 19, at 100-101.
232. One lawsuit challenging DADT subsequent to Lawrence is currently
pending in a federal district court in Boston. Lornet Turnbull, Seattle Man
Forcedfrom Navy Fights "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," THE SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 19,
2005, at Al.
233. Hensala v. Dep't of the Air Force, 343 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2003).
234. Id. at 955.
235. Id. at 956.
236. Id.
237. See Hunter, supra note 81, at 1128.
238. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 208 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
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down when applied to heterosexual people who engage in
sodomy.2 39 Some legal commentators proclaim this latter
decision a victory for gay and lesbian people with respect to
both the criminal sodomy statute and DADT.24 ° Others have
argued that Lawrence requires strict scrutiny because a
fundamental right to private sexual conduct is implicated,
and DADT cannot survive such scrutiny.2 4 '
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The United States and its military suffer along with gay
servicemembers who face discrimination under DADT, and no
remedy exists under the traditional constitutional rights
analysis for servicemembers who are discharged under
DADT. DADT keeps qualified and essential servicemembers
from pursuing military careers unless they are either
closeted, or openly gay but can prove they are celibate.
Despite the obvious problems associated with DADT, the
traditional legal scheme does not offer servicemembers
recourse for their discharge.
Under traditional constitutional rights analysis, DADT is
subject to rational basis review. The only available protection
beyond rational basis review requires the implication of a
fundamental right, a suspect class, or a quasi-suspect class.
Despite the strong language in Lawrence and its express
overruling of Bowers, there is no fundamental right to engage
in private consensual sexual conduct. In addition, gays and
lesbians are considered neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect
class. Without a different rubric for analysis, DADT will
continue to be upheld under rational basis review. This is an
injustice to gays and lesbians who wish to serve their country,
and it is detrimental to a military that is in need of able
individuals.

239. Michael Dobbs, Sodomy Conviction in Military Reversed: Gays Praise
Ruling As Key Legal Victory, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/ca/2004/12/08/MNGPBA8DOT1.DTL (last visited May 13,
2006).
240. Id.
241. See Gavin W. Scotti, Jr., Queer Eye for the Military Guy: Will "Don'tAsk,
Don't Tell" Survive in the Wake of Lawrence v. Texas?, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
897, 927 (2004).
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DADT

The Lawrence opinion is important for constitutional
challenges to DADT. Lawrence explicitly overruled Bowers,
the case upon which DADT rested and which courts followed
as precedent when they upheld the policy. 242 By holding that
no right to homosexual sodomy existed, Bowers justified
DADT and allowed courts freely to apply only rational basis
review to DADT.24 3 Without such a right to homosexual
sodomy, and in light of legislatures' ability to criminalize it,
the military could have a policy that allowed discharge of
members based on such conduct. However, since Bowers is no
longer binding precedent, the rationale for the application of
rational basis review to uphold DADT is questionable.
Indeed, the ambiguity of Lawrence is evidenced by the
subsequent array of law review articles and commentaries on
affects the constitutional analysis of gay
how Lawrence
244
rights.
In addition to overruling Bowers, the language used in
the Lawrence opinion extends the line of cases that applied a
higher level of scrutiny without expressly permitting such
heightened scrutiny. Most interpretations of Lawrence have
tried to pigeonhole the opinion into either a fundamental
rights analysis requiring strict scrutiny 245 or a nonfundamental rights analysis requiring rational basis
24
This narrow view overlooks an alternative
review. 46
interpretation, supported by the fact that the majority, which
surely was aware of the traditional rights analysis structure,
chose not to employ it. 247 Instead, Lawrence is an example of
the Court's struggle with the rigid structure of rights
analysis.248
In blurring the distinct tiered test for substantive due
process analysis, the Court revealed its intent not to be bound
by a particular structure, but rather to use common sense to

242. See discussion supra Part II.C.2, 4.
243. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
244. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
245. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 100, at 1155 ("The better reading of
Lawrence is that the Court views the right as fundamental.").
246. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 94, at 698 ("IT]he Court subjected the
Georgia anti-sodomy statute to rational review.").
247. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-68 (2003).
248. See Leonard, supra note 5, at 209.
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determine whether a law infringes upon a right.2 49 Though
he did not say so, Justice Kennedy showed his willingness to
apply a higher standard of review to gay rights cases through
his grandiose language and his use of particular precedents
such as Casey and Romer.25 °
While the majority did not state that private consensual
conduct is a fundamental right, the strong language used also
suggests that rational basis review is not the appropriate
level of scrutiny. Lawrence discussed private consensual
sexual conduct in terms of "liberty" and the opinion even
begins with that pregnant word.2 51 Justice Kennedy said:
"Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes
an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case
involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and more
transcendent dimensions."2 52 The presence of such grand
language suggests that the opinion analyzed the Texas
statute under a standard higher than rational basis. Given
this new realm of rational basis with bite, 253 it is not
surprising that Justice Kennedy did not label his discussion
as intermediate scrutiny, especially because he may not have
been able to garner a sufficient number of supporting votes.
Another aspect of Lawrence that suggests willingness to
apply a higher standard of review to gay rights issues is the
precedent the majority cited. Justice Kennedy specifically
mentioned cases that either clearly ignored the tiered
analysis or applied rational basis review with extra rigor. For
instance, the majority opinion cited to Casey,2 54 a substantive
due process opinion in which the Court declined to apply the
rigid tiered structure but rather contemplated whether a
right had actually been infringed.2 5 5 In Casey, a plurality
omitted the tiered analysis and chose a new "undue burden"
test.256 In addition, Justice Kennedy discussed Romer,257 an
249. See id.
250. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
251. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
252. Id.
253. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.d-e.
254. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
255. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See also discussion
supra Part II.A.2.a.
256. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
257. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). See also discussion supra Part
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opinion he authored in which he did not indicate which test
he applied.2 58
The fact that Lawrence is a substantive due process case
does not mean that it is inapplicable to an equal protection
case. Indeed, rights protected under substantive due process
can determine the appropriate level of scrutiny in an equal
protection case.259
This is most evident when, under
substantive due process, there is a fundamental right
involved. In such a case, the level of scrutiny in the equal
protection case rises to strict scrutiny.2 6 0 Likewise, when a
fundamental right is absent, equal protection cases are
analyzed under rational basis review.26 1 In recent years, the
Court has blurred these bright theoretical distinctions in both
substantive due process and equal protection cases.26 2
Lawrence and its recent predecessors open the door to
intermediate scrutiny when discrimination and a quasifundamental right are involved. In Romer and Cleburne, the
Court applied what appears to be a heightened form of
rational basis, or rational basis with bite.2 63 Plyler is the
clearest example of this analysis. In Plyler, the Court
appeared to find a quasi-fundamental right to education and
discrimination against a semi-unprotected class of children
aliens.2 64 As a result of this combination, the Court struck
down the Texas scheme, finding it lacked a "substantial"
purpose,2 65 a term characteristically used with intermediate
scrutiny.26 6 Another articulation of this standard is available
in Justice Marshall's dissent in Cleburne. Justice Marshall
suggested that the level of scrutiny should increase when
there is both discrimination and infringement of even a non-

II.A.2.e.
258. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574. Justice Scalia assumes that the majority
surreptitiously agreed on rational basis. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). However, Justice Kennedy's analysis of Amendment 2, particularly
the care with which Justice Kennedy examined its under and overinclusiveness, suggests that he applied a higher level a scrutiny.
259. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 696-97.
260. Id. at 532-33.
261. Id. at 695.
262. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
263. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.d-e.
264. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219-21 (1982).
265. Id. at 230.
266. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 529.
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Since the Court already applies
fundamental right.26 7
intermediate scrutiny in equal protection cases,268 to employ
Justice Marshall's test would not be a dramatic doctrinal shift
but rather another avenue for applying that level of scrutiny.
V. PROPOSAL
A.

The ProperStandardfor ConstitutionalAnalysis of DADT

Analysis of DADT under the equal protection component
of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is appropriate
because DADT creates a situation in which gay and lesbian
servicemembers are treated differently than heterosexual
servicemembers. DADT is not only conduct-based, it is also
status-based since it defines homosexual conduct as any
physical contact between people of the same sex.2 69 DADT
does not target stereotypically homosexual conduct such as
anal or oral sex regardless of whether it is performed by
Instead, DADT targets
heterosexuals or homosexuals.
homosexuals who engage in physical conduct.27 1 It goes even
by requiring
that
further
to target
homosexuals
servicemembers prove they do not have a propensity to
engage in homosexual conduct in order to rebut the
presumption of such propensity. 272 Of course, only gay,
lesbian, or bisexual people have a propensity to engage in
physical conduct with people of the same sex.273 Therefore,
the policy targets and discriminates against gay and lesbian
people based on their sexual orientation, not just their
conduct.2 74
The decisive question is which standard courts should
The safe
apply under equal protection analysis.
underpinning of Bowers on which courts previously leaned
267. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 460-65 (1985)

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
268. The areas in which the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny are
gender and illegitimacy. See id. at 441.
269. See discussion supra Part II.C.2-3.
270. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3)(A)-(B) (2000).
271. See discussion supra Part II.C.
272. See discussion supra Part II.C. Heterosexual people can engage in
"homosexual conduct," such as oral sex, as well.
273. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 941-42 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J.,
concurring).
274. See id. at 934-35 (Luttig, J., concurring).
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was overturned by Lawrence,275 so rational basis review is no
longer the obvious choice of scrutiny. Since Lawrence did not
implicate a fundamental right,276 it is unlikely that the Court
will apply strict scrutiny. 7 Further, this lack of a clear
fundamental right implies that gay and lesbian people will
not qualify as a quasi-suspect class under the test laid out in
High Tech Gays.2 7 ' Therefore, this potential avenue will not
lead to intermediate scrutiny.
As a result, the proper analysis under equal protection
cannot include any of the traditional threshold questions
asked to determine the proper level of scrutiny. Another
alternative is to apply rational basis with bite.2 79 Instead of
doing this, however, the Court should state that it is applying
intermediate scrutiny and then apply it. 2 0 This is important
for at least two reasons. 28 1 First, the application of a higher
standard under the guise of rational basis review allows the
Court and lower courts to apply a heightened level of scrutiny

275. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). See also Hunter, supra
note 81, at 1128. Hunter further argues that Lawrence does not make any
inevitable changes to DADT but that Lawrence removes "the imprimatur for
antigay stigma provided by sodomy law" and makes it more difficult to uphold
the rationales supporting DADT. Id.
276. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
277. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. In order for strict scrutiny to apply,
the Court would have to identify gays and lesbians as a suspect class, or private
consensual conduct as a fundamental right. See id.
278. High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1990) (paraphrasing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987)).
There are other potential problems with classifying gays and lesbians as a
quasi-suspect class. The Ninth Circuit in High Tech Gays accepted that there
was a history of discrimination, thereby satisfying the first prong of the test for
a quasi-suspect class. Id. The Supreme Court in Lawrence, however, rejects
Bowers' assertion that there has been a historical precedent against
homosexuality and notes that homosexual conduct had not been actively
prosecuted until the 1970s. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. Therefore, the first
prong of the test for a quasi-suspect class may also present an obstacle to that
particular avenue to intermediate scrutiny.
279. See supra Part II.A.2.d-e.
280. Other authors have suggested that the court should stop using rational
basis with bite without articulating a clear heightened scrutiny standard. See,
e.g., Jeremy B. Smith, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme
Court Should Acknowledge its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2805
(2005).
281. Two other problems created by not articulating a standard are
inconsistency among the circuits and that courts who do attempt to apply the
standard face criticism. Id.
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to other classifications that would otherwise be subject to only
Second, it provides even less
rational basis review.21 2
guidance to lower courts to assess cases that are already
difficult to characterize.2" 3 Therefore, the Court should apply
test that Justice Marshall
the "heightened scrutiny"
28 4
advocated in Cleburne.
B. The Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to DADT
The two factors that Justice Marshall highlights to
elevate the level of scrutiny are present in the DADT policy:
invidious discrimination and impingement of a right.28 5 First,
there is invidious discrimination against gay and lesbian
people in the military. Prior to DADT, the military explicitly
banned gay and lesbian servicemembers.28 6 Similarly, DADT
constitutes invidious discrimination even though it is less
blatant. It is still status-based since it defines the conduct
that is actionable in terms of homosexuality.2" 7 Indeed, one
scholar notes that "[flellatio is no longer oral-genital contact
but heterosexual or homosexual conduct, the deed of a certain
type of person. The distinct procedural scripts for conduct
thus depend on status ascriptions."28 8 Even General Norman
Schwarzkopf admitted in his testimony regarding the
necessity of this policy that unit cohesion suffers and people
refuse to enlist because, "[flor whatever reason, the
organization is divided into a majority who oppose, a small
minority who approve, and other groups who either don't care
or just wish the problem would go away."28 9 Moreover,
Justice Marshall argued that a characteristic that the law
targets need not "virtually always be irrelevant to warrant

282. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 459-60 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Classifications that have always been subject to
rational basis review are economic and commercial distinctions. Id. at 460
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
283. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
284. See discussion supra II.A.2.d.
285. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
286. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 935 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J.,
concurring) ("For as long as it has had a military, the United States has
excluded homosexuals for military service.").
287. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
288. HALLEY, supra note 19, at 39.
289. Policy Concerning Homosexuality Hearings, supra note 192, at 596
(statement of General Normal Schwarzkopf, United States Army).
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heightened scrutiny."29" Therefore, even if the military has
some articulated basis for the exclusion of open homosexuals
under DADT, the policy must still survive heightened
scrutiny.
Second, in light of Lawrence, DADT clearly impinges on a
right to engage in private consensual sexual conduct that the
Court articulated and protected under the general category of
"liberty."291 Despite the fact that the Court did not explicitly
recognize the right to engage in private sexual conduct as
fundamental,2 92 there is clearly some right couched in terms
of "liberty" that the Constitution protects.2 93 Since DADT's
distinction between heterosexuals and homosexuals is clearly
drawn on an invidious basis of hatred and discomfort, 294 and
since gay and lesbian people have a recognizable right to
engage in sexual conduct on which DADT impinges,2 9 5 DADT
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Under intermediate scrutiny, the government policy
must be substantially related to a legitimate government
interest. 296
The military's interest in unit cohesion is
certainly a legitimate government interest. However, DADT
is not substantially related to such an interest. Despite
assertions to the contrary,29 7 it is evident that openly gay
servicemembers apparently have served in the military
without causing detriment to unit cohesion.2 98 For instance,
studies of other nations that indicate that unit cohesion does
not suffer because of the presence of openly gay
servicemembers. 299 This appeal to international approaches
is particularly relevant since Justice Kennedy in Lawrence
examined other nations to discredit the reasoning of
Bowers.20 Moreover, military personnel concede that there
are plenty of gays and lesbians who have served the United
290. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
291. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b. The Lawrence opinion itself even
begins with the word "[1]iberty." Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
292. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003).
293. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
294. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
295. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
296. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
297. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
298. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
299. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
300. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003).
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States well. ° ' Certainly these individuals would not have
such great service records if they had caused problems in
their units or if the officers had problems with subordinates.
Tellingly, DADT itself contains inconsistencies that
refute the argument that unit cohesion suffers when openly
gay and sexually active people are allowed to serve. If unit
cohesion truly suffers as military officials assert it does, 02
there would be no reason for DADT to allow the military to
retain servicemembers who state that they are gay or engage
in homosexual conduct as defined by the statute. 3
If unit
cohesion were in such danger from open gays and lesbians,
the military would discharge servicemembers who state that
they are gay, regardless of its motive or veracity, 30 4 because
such a statement would probably have the same effect on unit
cohesion. It is likewise inconsistent for the military to say on
the one hand that unit cohesion suffers because of openly gay
servicemembers, 3°5 and on the other hand to reserve the right
to retain an openly gay servicemember when it is "in the best
interest of the armed forces."30 6 These inconsistencies suggest
that excluding gay and lesbian servicemembers is not
substantially related to the government's interest.
In addition to the inconsistencies within the policy itself,
unit cohesion and the military as a whole may suffer from the
mere fact that servicemembers may lie to remain in the
service. As one dissenter on the Ninth Circuit noted, "[the
policy] seems entirely inconsistent with the proud traditions
of our armed forces, with the slogans of Duty, Honor,
Country, the Honor Codes, and the teachings that those who
are wrongdoers or even know of wrongdoing are obligated to
come forward and make full disclosure."3 7
Also, the military may actually weaken itself by adhering
301. As General Norman Schwarzkopf said in his testimony, "homosexuals
have served in the past and done a great job serving their country, and I feel
they can in the future." Policy ConcerningHomosexuality Hearings,supra note
192, at 612 (testimony of General Norman Schwarzkopf, United States Army).
302. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
303. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
304. 10 U.S.C. § 654(e)(1) (2000). A servicemember should not be discharged
if the person "engaged in conduct or made statements for the purpose of
avoiding or terminating military service." Id.
305. Id. § 654(a)(15).
306. Id. § 654(e)(2).
307. Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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to the DADT policy. Given the hostile environment in which
openly gay and lesbian individuals are either discharged or
initially discouraged from joining the armed forces, the
military loses qualified personnel. 08 In fact, under DADT,
the military has discharged nearly 10,000 servicemembers,
including numerous military personnel who held critical
positions and had language skills that are particularly
relevant to the war on terrorism.3 0 9 These statistics, along
with the internal and practical inconsistencies of DADT,
clearly indicate that the policy is not substantially related to
the government's interest in unit cohesion and overall
effectiveness.
Finally, one important method by which courts assess the
relationship of the government action to its objective is by
examining whether the policy or law is over-inclusive or
under-inclusive.3 10 An over-inclusive law applies not only to
similarly situated people, but also to those who are not
31 1
similarly situated, and therefore goes beyond its purpose.
An under-inclusive law applies only to some similarly
situated people and therefore does not completely accomplish
its purpose.3 1 2 While an over-inclusive or under-inclusive law
is not necessarily invalid, the courts are less tolerant of such
laws under intermediate scrutiny than under rational basis
review.31 3
DADT suffers from both over- and under-inclusiveness.
The ambiguity present in the language of DADT creates a
situation for grave over-inclusiveness that renders DADT not
substantially related to the interest of unit cohesion or any
other government justification. For example, acts that would
sufficiently satisfy a finding of homosexual conduct are
endless. As one scholar explains, "It could include getting
caught in flagrante delicto with a person of the same sex, or
caught holding hands affectionately with a person of the same
sex-or doing anything that a 'reasonable person' would think
might indicate a capacity to enjoy same-sex sex. "314

308. Mazur, supra note 202, at 439-40.
309. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 203, at 4.
310. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 531.

311.
312.
313.
314.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 532.
HALLEY, supra note 19, at 4.
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Furthermore, the "reasonable person" standard causes
further ambiguity, leading to overbreadth. The military in
general is hostile towards gays, and therefore its members
are more likely to find benign acts to be indicative of
homosexuality.3 1
Also, DADT "provide[s] no check on a
commander's decision about what a reasonable person would
think manifests a propensity. When a commander thinks
that befriending a 'known homosexual' manifests a
propensity, that's de jure reasonable."3 16 Finally, the term
"propensity" is also intentionally ambiguous because it refers
"just as much to homosexual status as to homosexual acts."31 7
Not only is DADT over-inclusive, but it is also underinclusive. President Clinton proposed a conduct-based
regulation assuming it would exclude only the type of
behavior that the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")
prohibited: sodomy, defined as oral-genital or anal-genital
contact, regardless of the same or different sex of the
participants. 3 "
Assuming this is the military's actual
purpose, and is not a pretext to exclude gays and lesbians,
DADT is under-inclusive because it does not target
heterosexuals. Indeed, DADT defines oral-genital and analgenital contact as "homosexual," even though it is possible for
heterosexuals to engage in this conduct. The legislative
history also indicates that Congress deleted language from
DADT that defined the prohibited conduct in terms of
concrete acts rather than in terms of the label of
homosexuality. 319 By excluding the possibility of discharging
heterosexuals for conduct that the UCMJ prohibits, DADT is
under-inclusive.
Assuming arguendo that the presence of openly gay
servicemembers adversely affects unit cohesion, and that
DADT is sufficiently tailored, the ethos upon which the
nation's democracy rests counsels against upholding the
policy. Unit cohesion suffers when subordinates refuse to
follow a gay leader's commands and when there is strife
among the troops. These problems, however, are not created
by the gay and lesbian servicemembers but rather by the
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 123.
at 4-5.
at 16.
at 107, 36.
at 36.

2006] LAWRENCE AND "DON'TASK, DON'T TELL"

673

other servicemembers who are prejudiced against them.2 °
Yet, as Justice O'Connor stated in Lawrence, "[m]oral
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the
group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational
basis of review under the Equal Protection Clause."32 1 So,
"[d]isapproval of homosexuality on the part of heterosexual
servicemembers is an impermissible reason for discriminating
against gay servicemembers." 322 This is true even if that
moral disapproval leads to problems in unit cohesion, a
presumption that has been rebutted with empirical
evidence.3 23 If this prejudice-laden foundation of DADT is not
sufficient for rational basis review, it is also necessarily
insufficient for intermediate scrutiny.
Though Justice
O'Connor may disagree since she reserved national security
as a legitimate state interest,3 2 4 the core basis for DADT's
unequal treatment is prejudice, and it therefore should be
impermissible despite the consequent effects of supposed
deterioration of unit cohesion.
Finally, there remains the issue of judicial deference to
the executive and legislative branches in military matters.
The judiciary should not shirk its duty to protect
constitutional rights of individuals. 25
Despite the
constitutionally mandated deference to the other branches in
military matters,3 26 the judiciary must ensure that the
military does not trample individual rights.3 27 The judiciary
should maintain an active check on the other branches of
government, at least when the other branches invade the

320. Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir. 1997) (B. Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
321. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003) (emphasis added).
322. Philips, 106 F.3d at 1436 (B. Fletcher, J., dissenting). See also
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 951 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J., dissenting)
("Private prejudice is a private matter; we are free to hate. But the same
concept of liberty for all that protects our prejudices precludes their
embodiment in law.").
323. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
324. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
325. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
326. See discussion supra Part II.B.
327. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 949 (4th Cir. 1996) (Hall, J.,
dissenting) ("I am convinced that the presence if a strong and independent
judiciary, upon which the people may rely to guard individual rights, deserves
much of the credit [for such a great military].").
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judiciary's clearly defined territory of individual rights. 28
As the government sends its troops to the far reaches of
the earth, it should do so without compromising the
democratic principles that are integral to the nation the
military protects. Therefore, when a military policy cannot be
justified under the appropriate standard, the judiciary should
strike it down for lack of compliance with the higher purposes
Constitutionally protected rights,
of the Constitution.
whatever their degree and characterization, mean nothing
unless they are protected in every context.
VI. CONCLUSION

Considering the fluid and amorphous nature of the
definition of constitutional rights, courts should be flexible in
their interpretation. With DADT, courts should recognize its
discriminatory reality and should follow the Supreme Court
in legitimating the privacy rights of gay and lesbian people as
did the Court in Lawrence.3 29 In so doing, courts should apply
an intermediate standard of review and strike down DADT as
an unconstitutional infringement of individual rights, despite
its military context.
Constitutional rights analysis, despite the Court's valiant
attempt to apply the traditional rigid tests, is evolving. The
Court is recognizing the spectrum that exists between the
polar opposites of rights and groups that deserve the utmost
protection possible and those that deserve mere lip service.
While this may force legislatures to consider carefully which
policies will be constitutional and which will not, the virtue of
an intermediate tier of scrutiny means that important rights
and groups of people will be protected from unwarranted
government sanction.
This middle ground is beneficial for a number of reasons.
It is sufficiently narrow because it adds to the existing
rational basis and strict scrutiny tests, rather than replacing
This standard is not so different as to make
them.
application impossible, but it is flexible enough so that courts
may utilize their judgment. More importantly, the standard
It
gives credence to the plight of gays and lesbians.
legitimizes the pleas of people who suffer discrimination on
328. See id. (Hall, J., dissenting).
329. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
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the basis of sexual orientation since it requires attention
above mere rational basis review.
As Justice Marshall
eloquently and wisely once said:
Heightened scrutiny does not allow courts to second-guess
reasoned legislative or professional judgments tailored to
the unique needs of a group . . . but it does seek to assure
that the hostility or thoughtlessness with which there is
reason to be concerned has not carried the day. By
invoking heightened scrutiny, the Court recognizes, and
compels lower courts to recognize, that a group may well
be the target of the sort of prejudiced, thoughtless, or
stereotyped action that offends principles of equality found
in the Fourteenth Amendment.33 °
Application of intermediate scrutiny also reflects common
sense. There are gradations of protection that rights and
groups should be afforded depending on the course of history.
The Court showed its willingness to be flexible in Lawrence,
broadly with Constitutional rights, and specifically with the
category of gay and lesbian rights. Future evaluation of
DADT by courts should likewise embrace the flexibility that
Justice Marshall recognized in Cleburne. Given this avenue,
courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to strike down
DADT as an unconstitutional infringement of individual
rights. This comports not only with the reality of the policy
and the harm it causes, but also the ethos of our democracy in
which the military, the judiciary, and individual citizens coexist.

330. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 472 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).

